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Abstract
As affective polarization rises in the United States, much scholarly work is devoted to
gridlock and hyper-partisanship. In this thesis, I examine whether the issue of crime and law
legislation has been impacted by rising polarization, or if it has been able to maintain a degree of
bipartisanship. With the use of data on 432 crime and law bills considered from 1989 to 2018, I
analyze the concept of issue ownership over crime and law legislation, create 18 different
subcategories within the crime and law category, and conduct four network analyses which
examine the role of thresholds in facilitating bipartisan collaboration. In doing so, I create several
new variables, including Cosponsorship Partisan Difference (CPD) and Sponsorship Partisan
Difference (SPD) in order to conceptualize degrees of hyper-partisanship and bipartisanship. I
make several key findings, including that CPD is a critical factor which sets apart the most
successful sessions and bills, and that individual senators skilled in bipartisan collaboration serve
as crucial actors in the most successful session networks.
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Introduction
When the First Step Act passed in 2018, elected officials and media pundits alike praised
the criminal justice reform bill as a rare moment of bipartisanship in a hyper-partisan era. A well
documented body of literature indicates that, in some ways, the current era is in fact increasingly
polarized. Specifically, affective polarization between Democrats and Republicans has sharply
increased in recent years, due to “increasingly negative feelings toward the opposing party and
its leaders”' (Webster, 2017). However, does the issue of crime and law legislation see the same
degrees of hyper-partisanship? On a broader scale, does affective polarization among the public
lead to substantive polarization among elites on the issue of crime and law?
A few key questions arise. First, I apply Petrocik’s (1996) idea of issue ownership in
order to determine whether either party has more of an electoral mandate to address the issue of
crime and law, and whether this mandate translates into increased party interest or success in the
area. Second, I consider the variation within the larger category through analysis of subcategories
within crime and law bills. I apply Haidt and Joseph’s (2007) idea of moral foundations theory to
hypothesize which party will specialize in which subcategory and why. Third, I examine how
individual senators or relationships between senators may contribute to bipartisan collaboration
and bill success through 4 network analyses of the top performing sessions. I apply Granovetter’s
(1973) social contagion theory to conceptualize senators’ thresholds for participation and the
flow of influence throughout the Senate network. I seek to fill gaps in the literature by
considering these theories—traditionally isolated in their respective fields of political science,
political psychology, and sociology—in conjunction with one another.
I chose to focus on the Senate for a number of reasons. First, the smaller size of the
chamber lends to higher likelihood of each senator collaborating with another. The smaller
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number of members also enabled me to focus on not only larger patterns across the parties, but
also on patterns at the individual senator level. Second, longer terms in the Senate may facilitate
deeper relationships between senators and may buffer against rising polarization due to lower
rates of member replacement (Theriault, 2006; Bonica, 2014).
In this thesis, I build on a growing body of literature which seeks to consider bipartisan
collaboration beyond the traditional narrow focus on final vote tally. This is because final voting
patterns tend to be highly constrained by party leadership, who exert particular influence in order
to whip the vote along party lines (Rippere, 2016). Instead, I focus on bill sponsorship and
cosponsorship. A bill can only have one sponsor; this is the representative who introduces the
bill in the Senate chamber. There are no limits on how many cosponsors a bill can have, though a
bill is not required to obtain cosponsors. Signing onto a bill as a cosponsor is thought to be an
indication of support for that bill (Oleszek, 2021). Importantly, the decision to cosponsor on a
bill is less controlled by party leadership than the final vote tally; rather, cosponsorship is more
of an individual choice. I focus on the role of bill cosponsorship as a crucial way to build
bipartisan relationships and cross-coalitional support. I also use patterns in bill sponsorship as a
reflection of individual senator’s policy priorities.
I chose to focus on crime and law legislation because of its applicability to both the
question of issue ownership and bipartisan collaboration. Historically, prominent Republicans
from Richard Nixon to George Wallace have weaponized “tough on crime” and “law and order”
stances in order to cast a contrast between the Republican party and the Democratic party.
However, beginning with the 1992 presidential campaign of Bill Clinton, some Democrats began
to seize upon tough on crime stances themselves in order to blunt perceived weaknesses (Holian,
2004). Did this shift in stance result in a lasting change in issue ownership, or could it facilitate
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more bipartisanship because of seemingly converging opinions on the issue? This thesis looks
for answers in sponsorship and cosponsorship data.
A second question is why to focus on this issue now. For one, the summer of 2020 saw a
swell of support for criminal justice reforms; an AP-NORC poll in June found that nearly 70% of
respondents indicated that the criminal justice system needed at least major reforms; just 5% said
no changes were needed (Long and Fingerhut, 2020). Efforts to “defund,” reallocate, or reduce
police funding have also risen to prominence, with some major newspapers even pointing to the
slogan as the reason for a disappointing 2020 election year for Congressional Democrats
(Otterbein, 2021; Memoli, 2020; Ferré-Sadurní and McKinley, 2020). Secondly, President Biden
has signaled an interest in working with Congress to pass bipartisan criminal justice reform
legislation and has himself previously worked actively in this issue area (Johnson, 2021).
Therefore, this issue area remains a relevant and significant one.
II. Methodology
In order to answer these questions, I data scraped information on the 432 crime and law
bills originating in the Senate between the 101st (1989-1990) and the 115th (2015-2016) sessions
from the Library of Congress database.1 I used the Library of Congress filter for
“Subject—Policy Area” to pull bills from the “Crime and Law Enforcement” category. I
collected information on bills, not joint resolutions and specified that the “Status of Legislation”
was at least “Committee Consideration.” For each bill, I collected data on the bill sponsor,
cosponsor(s), date introduced, committee(s), latest status in Congress, date last considered, latest
action, and bill summary.
1 To explore the database, see: https://www.congress.gov/
7
In order to conceptualize degrees of bipartisan collaboration amongst cosponsors, I
created the variable Cosponsor Partisan Difference (CPD). CPD considers, on the bill level, the
proportion of cosponsors from both party wherein:
Cosponsor Partisan Difference (CPD) =
Total Proportion Dem. Cosponsors - Total Proportion Repub. Cosponsors
Absolute Bipartisanship= 0
Absolute Democratic Partisanship= +1
Absolute Republican Partisanship= -1
Figure 0.1
The result is a scale of +1 to -1. A score of +1 indicates highest Democratic partisanship;
this would mean 100% of cosponsors are Democrats. A score of -1 indicates the highest
Republican partisanship, which would indicate 100% of cosponsors are Republicans. A score of
0 represents absolute bipartisanship, wherein 50% of cosponsors are Democrats, and 50% of
cosponsors are Republicans. Average Cosponsor Partisan Difference (ACPD) takes the average
of CPD’s across multiple bills, often for all bills within one session. Total Cosponsor Partisan
Difference (TCPD) uses the total number of cosponsors from each party in order to calculate
proportions of each party represented among cosponsors, often within one session. This
conceptualization allows for a quantification and standardization of a scale of hyperpartisanship
to bipartisanship.
In order to conceptualize patterns in bill sponsorship, I created the variable Sponsorship
Partisan Difference (SPD). SPD is a session-level variable which takes the proportion of bills
sponsored by each party, wherein:
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Sponsorship Partisan Difference (SPD) =
Proportion Dem. Sponsored Bills - Proportion Repub. Sponsored Bills
Absolute Bipartisanship= 0
Absolute Democratic Partisanship= +1
Absolute Republican Partisanship= -1
SPD also uses a scale of +1 to -1. If Democrats sponsor 100% of the bills, the SPD score
would be +1. If Republicans sponsor 100% of the bills, the SPD score would be -1. If there is an
even split between the parties in bill sponsorship, the SPD score would be 0. Average
Sponsorship Partisan Difference (ASPD) takes the average SPD score across multiple sessions.
This variable helps guage party interest in an issue area: if Republicans sponsor 90% of all crime
and law bills in the subcategory of law enforcement/policing for one session, this subcategory is
likely more of a priority for the Republican party that session than for the Democratic party. This
variable, therefore, may serve as a useful indicator of party issue ownership.
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Chapter I: Party Issue Ownership in Crime and Law Legislation
I. Introduction
On a broad level, a fundamental question regarding crime and law legislation is whether,
first, the issue area remains of interest to senators despite falling crime levels; and, second,
whether the issue area has been impacted by rising levels of affective polarization. This chapter
will first address those two questions before examining the idea of party issue ownership within
crime and law legislation.
II. Patterns in Crime and Law Legislation
The area of crime and law has inspired an abundance of research, including a
well-documented finding that, despite steadily decreasing crime levels in the United States, the
U.S. public tends to overestimate crime rates (Roberts, 1992). Likewise, the amount of crime and
law bills considered since the 113th session have been steadily rising. The 115th session broke
the record for most crime and law bills introduced (56 bills), despite historically low levels of
crime (F.B.I., 2018) [Figure 1.1]. Therefore, the issue of crime and law appears to remain a
salient one not only to the general public, but also to senators.
Despite apparent polizaration, there are also signs that senators’ interest in collaborating
on crime and law bills is rising as well. Of the 432 crime and law bills considered in this time
period, 93.8% had at least one cosponsor. The number of total cosponsors on these bills has more
than tripled from 284 in the 101st session to 865 in the 115th session [Figure 1.2]. The average
number of cosponsors per bill has almost doubled: there were on average 10 cosponsors on crime
and law bills in the 101st session, as compared to 19 cosponsors on these bills in the 114th, and




Furthermore, the rise in cosponsors was not limited to increased collaboration within the
separate parties. Rather, 75.9% of these bills had at least one member of the opposite party
included in its cosponsors, and 13.7% of these bills had an equal proportion of members of both
parties represented in its cosponsors. In recent years, this collaboration did not splinter alongside
rising polarization, but instead remained higher than average: bills with at least one member of
the opposite party amongst its cosponsors was 84.3% in the 114th session, and 81.1% in the
11
115th session. The last two sessions also had an above average amount of bills with an equal
proportion of cosponsors from both parties, accounting for 18.8% in the 114th and 20.8% in the
115th. These factors seem to indicate that the issue area of crime and law has maintained a
certain degree of bipartisan collaboration, despite rising polarization.
II. Issue Ownership of Crime & Law Legislation
Beneath the particulars of which party supports which type of bill is a more fundamental
issue: which party owns the issue of crime and law legislation? Issue ownership, as defined by
Petrocik (1996, p.826), holds that voters perceive that a given party is “better able” to “resolve a
certain problem facing the country” as opposed to the alternate party. Voters construct this
opinion based on a party’s perceived “reputation for policy and program interest” (Petrocik,
1996, p. 826). In practice, this means that voters in the United States frequently sort issues as
“belonging” to either Democrats or Republicans. Petrocik’s initial survey found that, on the issue
of crime, 46% of respondents indicated that they trusted Republicans more, and 28% indicated
they trusted Democrats more (1996).
Issue ownership may also be influenced by the idea of partisan identification as a
“perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable” to his or her
partisan orientation (Campbell et. al, 1960, p. 133). The perceptual screen may be especially
relevant in relation to partisan control of the Senate: when one party holds a majority in the
Senate, their perceptual screens may influence them to think that they hold issue ownership over
all issues due to their control of the chamber. Each party’s commitment to enacting legislation
related to these issue areas relates to the idea of reference groups, wherein “reference groups and
their leaders provide norms and strategies for setting personal values and goals” (Miller and
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Levitin 1977, p. 31). On a practical level, this means that senators are attuned to and incentivized
to follow the preferences of their party and party leaders.
While it is beyond the purview of this paper to consider voter behavior, the construction
of a reputation for policy and program interest is of particular relevance for this study. Does
conservatives’ desire to reduce fear and punish deviant behavior lead to a greater crime policy
interest for Republicans? Or does liberals’ desire to reduce harm and extend social justice lend to
Democratic issue ownership in this area?
One way to measure policy interest is through patterns in bill sponsorship. From the
101st session to the 115th, senators have introduced 432 crime and law bills that have received at
least committee consideration. Overall Democrats have sponsored 58.8% (254) of all crime and
law bills, and Republicans have sponsored 33.5% (178). Figure 1.3 demonstrates the great
degree of variation in party sponsorship of crime and law legislation by session. Notably, many
shifts appeared to occur between which party sponsored the most legislation in this area, such as
large peaks occurring after the 113th for Republicans, and the 107th session for Democrats.
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Figure 1.3
Are these shifts purely a function of changes in party control over the Senate? Given the
expansive powers held by the party in control of the Senate—like committee leadership, and
partisan decision making over which legislation to bring to the floor for a hearing—one might
expect that bill sponsorship would follow patterns of party control. Specifically, when
Republicans control the Senate, Republicans would lead in bill sponsorship; and when
Democrats control the Senate, Democrats would lead in bill sponsorship. However, if there is
significant issue ownership, bill sponsorship may be resistant to patterns in party control.
Figure 1.4 analyzes this question by comparing Sponsorship Partisan Difference (SPD) to
party control of the Senate. Democratic hyper-partisanship in bill sponsorship peaked in the
111th session (+.93); Republican hyper-partisanship in sponsorship peaked in the 104th session
(-.76). At -.28, sponsorship patterns in the 115th session were the closest to absolute
bipartisanship in SPD. Overall, the data seems to support the idea that the party in control of the
Senate is the party most likely to sponsor legislation in this area. One example of this idea is the
111th session, when Democratic partisan composition of the Senate jumped up to +.18, and
Democratic SPD hit its high water mark as well (+.93). Across all sessions, SPD averaged at
+.16, skewing slightly towards Democrats. Likewise, in sessions when partisan differences in
Senate composition narrow, Democratic SPD rises as well. Such is the case for the 107th session




However, sponsorship data is only one of the measures of policy participation in the
Senate; patterns in cosponsorship offer a more complete view into each party's participation in
crime and law bills. Overall, Democrats have accounted for 60.9% of all cosponsors on crime
and law bills, and Republicans account for 39.5%. Across all sessions, on every crime and law
bill, there were an average of 7.7 Democratic cosponsors, and 5 Republican cosponsors.
Another way to conceptualize this is through analyzing Cosponsor Partisan Difference
(CPD) along with party control of the Senate [Figure 1.5]. Notably, CPD appeared to be more
resistant to changes in party control; note the less drastic peaks and valleys in Figure 1.5. In other
words, partisan margins were much slimmer for cosponsors than for sponsors. Across all
sessions, CPD averaged +.21, leaning slightly more Democratic. CPD came the closest to
absolute bipartisanship in the 114th session (-.01), the 106th session (-.02), and the 108th session
(-.07). Notably, the 106th and 108th sessions rank as the highest success rates of all sessions, and
the 114th session ranks as the fourth most successful session. CPD peaked for Democrats in the
113th session (+.57), and for the Republicans in the 105th session (-.44).
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Figure 1.5
A deeper dive into partisan participation in crime and law legislation compares partisan
shares of the senate to partisan shares in bill sponsorship and cosponsorship [Figure 1.6, Figure
1.7]. A few things stand out in these graphs. First of all, Democrats account for a larger share of
sponsors than their Senate share 53.3% of the time, and Republicans 46.7% of the time.
Secondly, Democrats account for a larger proportion of cosponsors than their Senate share 73.3%
of the time; in contrast, Republicans account for a larger proportion of cosponsors than their
Senate share only 26.7% of the time. Therefore, Democrats consistently over perform their
Senate margins in crime and law participation, while Republicans tend to underperform their
Senate margins, especially in terms of co-sponsoring bills. This is to say that, even when
Democrats lose power in the Senate chamber, Democrats continue to participate in crime and law




This seems to suggest a Democratic enthusiasm for participating in crime and law bills,
but does Democratic interest in bills translate into success in passing these bills into law? Party
success in crime and law bill passage diverges from measures of bill sponsorship: 55 crime and
law bills sponsored by Republicans have been passed into law, as compared to 50 crime and law
bills sponsored by Democrats. Therefore, while Democrats have sponsored more crime and law
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bills overall, Republicans have sponsored more successful crime and law bills. The share of
successful Republican crime and law bills accounts for 30.9% of these bills sponsored by
Republicans; success rate for crime and law bills sponsored by Democrats is 19.7%.
III. Crime & Law Bill Success by Session & Party
There are two broad schools of thought regarding how the parties successfully pass
legislation. In one approach, which can be thought of as a “scorched earth” approach, parties
capitalize on partisan control of the Senate: when Democrats are in control of the Senate, they
are capable of pushing legislation through the chamber with only the support of their own party,
and vice versa. This approach might predict that the most successful sessions for crime and law
legislation would be those in which Democrats hold larger partisan margins, because Democrats
are more prolific in crime and law bill sponsorship. On the other hand, given that Republicans
have sponsored a greater proportion of all successful crime and law bills, sessions with the
highest Republican margins might therefore be expected to be the most successful. Another
approach, which can be thought of as the “middle ground approach,” holds that parties are better
served collaborating with each other, making concessions, and passing bills which hold
bipartisan support. This approach would predict that the most successful sessions would be those
sessions with the tightest partisan margins, as narrow majorities would encourage collaboration
with the minority party.
Before examining each strategy, it is worth noting that there are a few ways to calculate
“legislative success.” One way to conceptualize success rates for bills makes use of the Library
of Congress' tracker feature, which categorizes bills' status as in one of six categories:
introduced, passed senate, passed house, resolving differences, to president, and became law.
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Any bill which reaches that final phase on the tracker is counted as a success. Another way to
conceptualize success rates for bills is on a binary scale of passed into law or failed. The binary
scale uses not only the tracker feature, but also the Library of Congress' ``notes'' description;
because of this, the binary scale counts as a success those bills which were reconciled with a
House bill to become law. For example, the tracker for the 107th session's Federal Bureau of
Investigation Reform Act of 2002 shows that the bill has only been introduced, yet the notes
indicate that the bill was reconciled with H.R. 2215 and subsequently passed into law.
Using the first method, sessions with the highest success rate include the 108th (47.6%),
the 111th (36.7%), and the 114th (34.4%). Using the binary scale, the most successful sessions
shifts slightly: sessions with the highest success rates for crime and law bills include the 108th
(47.6%), 106th (45.8%), and 111th (43.3%). Due to the high degree of overlap between both
calculations, all 4 sessions—106, 108, 111, and 114—will be included as the top most successful
sessions, in order to capture the most complete picture of those bills which eventually became
law. These 4 sessions all had strong comparative success in crime and law legislation versus
overall legislation: comparative success rate for crime and law bills was more than double the
average for all sessions [Table 1.1].
Table 1.1 Most Successful Sessions: Crime and Law Success Rate vs. Overall Success Rate
Success rate by session followed an almost saw tooth pattern. This may indicate a
tendency for the Senate to focus on one issue for one session, uses up political capital, and then
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moves on to another issue in the next session. Examples of this include the prolific 111th
session—which saw 43.3% of all crime and law bills passed—followed by the 112th
session—which saw the lowest percentage of crime and law bills passed at 5.7% passed.
Between the two sessions, there was a 37.5% decline in success rate. Likewise, success rate for
crime and law bills dropped 37% between the 106th and 107th sessions, then rebounded 38.8%
for the 108th session.
Figure 1.9
Regarding partisan control and crime and law bill success, there seems to be no pattern
between party control and bill success [Table 1.2]. Of the most successful sessions, the 111th and
114th Senate compositions had large Democratic partisan margins. The 106th Senate
composition had a large Republican partisan margin, and the 108th Senate saw a slim Republican
advantage. Therefore, there appears to be no apparent advantage to slim partisan majorities, or
large partisan majorities for either party.
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Table 1.2 Most Successful Sessions: Senate Partisan Makeup
One indicator did set the most successful sessions apart from the average session: CPD.
The most successful sessions had less than half the average CPD of overall sessions [Table 1.3].
Successful sessions, therefore, more often drew in members from both parties to cosponsor roles,
despite wide variation in partisan Senate composition. This finding again underscores the
resistance of crime and law legislation to polarization: successful sessions as recent as the 114th
were able to achieve one of the most bipartisan scores on CPD (-.04).
Table 1.3 Most Successful Sessions vs. Average All Sessions
For Democrats, what distinguishes a successful crime bill from an unsuccessful bill? The
average number of cosponsors per bill remains roughly the same across passed and failed
Democratic-sponsored crime bills, as does the average number of Democratic cosponsors. There
were on average 2 additional Republican cosponsors on passed Democratic-sponsored crime
bills as compared to failed Democratic-sponsored crime bills. Most notably, the average CPD on
passed Democratic-sponsored bills was 21 points more bipartisan than failed
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Democratic-sponsored bills. Therefore, across all categories, Democratic-sponsored bills
benefitted from eliciting a more bipartisan set of collaborating Senators [Table 1.4].
Table 1.4 Democratic-sponsored: Passed vs. Failed Bills
A similar pattern emerges for successful Republican sponsored bills. The average number
of total cosponsors and average Democratic cosponsors remained roughly the same across passed
and failed Republican-sponsored bills. For successful Republican-sponsored bills, there were on
average 2 fewer Republican cosponsors as compared to unsuccessful bills. Likewise to
successful Democratic-sponsored bills, the average CPD on successful Republican-sponsored
bills was 19 points more bipartisan than failed Republican-sponsored bills [Table 1.5].
Table 1.5 Republican-Sponsored: Passed vs. Failed Bills
IV. Examining Bill Cycle
The previous sections consider bill outcomes in a binary sense—bills are either passed, or
failed—but such a consideration erases the variation in phases a bill can reach. The Library of
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Congress provides a tracker feature, which classifies bills into 6 primary categories: introduced,
passed senate, passed house, resolving differences, to president, and became law. The tracker
denotes the latest action on a bill. For example, a “2” on the tracker passed the Senate, but was
unable to pass the House. See Figure 1.10 for an example of the Library of Congress tracker.
Figure 1.10
This tool allows a snapshot of the lifecycle of crime and law bills through the Senate: for
62.4% of all crime and law bills, the latest action received was introduction; for 19.1%, latest
action was passing the Senate; only .69% of all these bills' latest action was passing the House;
.46% went no further than resolving differences; 0% made it no further than the president's desk;
and 17.3% became law. These percentages reveal a few things of note. Firstly, a very small
percentage of bills died after passing both the Senate and the House and after differences were
resolved between the Senate and House versions of a bill. Secondly, only one bill was vetoed by
the president, and the veto was eventually overturned by Congress in order to pass the bill into
law. This suggests a sort of “threshold’’ in which if a bill reaches a certain step in the process, it
is likely to be passed into law.
This feature allows a more granular look at the impact of CPD on Democratic- and
Republican-sponsored crime bills subdivides bills into quartiles by levels of CPD. I compared
the life cycle of the bills with the most partisan makeup of Democratic cosponsors, to the bills
with the most partisan makeup of Republican cosponsors [Table 1.6]. There are three main things
to note from this figure. First, for both parties, the threshold concept appears again. Given the
extremely low percentage of bills which go no further than resolving differences or to the
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president’s desk, it seems that the threshold for bills becoming law is passing the House. If bills
pass the House, they are likely to become law, and not stop at the resolving differences, or
awaiting signature from the president phase. Second, the most partisan Democratic bills were
more likely than the most partisan Republican bills to go no further than the introduction phase.
Third, highly partisan Democratic bills were only about a third as likely to become law as
compared to highly partisan Republican bills. Taken together, these factors seem to suggest that
Democrats were more likely to be punished for pushing highly partisan crime and law bills.
Therefore, there seemed to be a perception of issue ownership attributed to Republicans in the
Senate.
Table 1.6 Tracker: Most Partisan Bills vs. Overall
V.  Discussion
In a hyper-partisan era, one might expect the Senate to grind to a halt on most issues.
Instead, I found that collaboration between the two parties on the issue of crime and law
legislation remains high, with bipartisanship among cosponsors ranking above average for the
two most recent sessions. Polarization also did not lead to gridlock: the two most recent sessions
had among the highest rates of success in passing crime and law legislation. Overall, I found that
success in crime and law legislation tends to follow a sawtooth pattern wherein a successful
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session is often followed by an unsuccessful session. This may indicate a tendency for focus on
crime and law legislation to be heightened one session, then shifted elsewhere the next session.
Recall in Petrocik’s (1996) original definition of issue ownership focuses on the
“perception” of which party is better able to handle the issue at hand. This distinction proved
crucial to analysis of issue ownership in crime and law legislation. Democrats indicated more
enthusiasm to handle the issue of crime and law. Overall, Democrats account for a higher
percentage of all sponsors and cosponsors, and this pattern persists even when partisan control
over the Senate becomes equal. However, this enthusiasm did not translate into success in
passing such legislation. Rather, Republicans passed a higher percentage of crime and law bills,
despite lower rates of sponsorship and cosponsorship in this area.
This may point to an idea of a perceived Republican ownership over crime and law bills
within the Senate. One example of this is the progress of highly partisan bills. Highly partisan
Democratic bills were much less likely to eventually be passed into law and are most likely to
make it no further than introduction. Highly partisan Republican bills, on the other hand,
performed roughly the same as or better than the average bill. For Democrats at least, this data
appears to reject the “scorched earth” strategy as a viable means to passing crime and law bills
into law. However, if Republican issue ownership were so absolute, one would expect to see
definitive peaks in crime and law bill success when Republican margins in the Senate were
highest, but this was not the case.
CPD emerged as a significant variable for crime and law bill success. Average CPD was
substantially lower for both the most successful sessions compared to overall sessions; and for
passed bills sponsored by either party, as compared to failed bills. Patterns in cosponsorship also
appeared more resistant to changes in party control of the Senate than did patterns in bill
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sponsorship: the party in control of the Senate often sponsored nearly all bills of the session, yet
peaks and valleys CPD remained milder. This may indicate a resistance to collaboration through
cosponsorship to polarizing changes in Senate control. Overall, these data suggest that the crucial
element to success for crime and law bills is less likely to be utilizing party margins to push
through highly partisan bills, but rather more likely related to the ability to draw in cosponsors
from the opposite party and craft a more bipartisan bill.
26
Chapter II: Moral Psychology &
Subcategories of Crime and Law Legislation
I. Introduction
The category of “crime and law” is a broad one with a great degree of variation within
the umbrella policy area. Bills included in this category range from border enforcement, to youth
handgun regulations, to flag protection, to equipment for law enforcement. Therefore,
considering just the broad category of crime and law may mask key differences in the subject
areas of the legislation considered. In this chapter, I consider subcategories within crime and law,
how analysis within these subcategories may provide further nuance to the consideration of party
issue ownership, and how moral psychology might lend to a more complete understanding of
which subcategories attract each party’s interest.
II. Bipartisanship & Moral Thinking
What is it about the area of crime and law that simultaneously attracts Democratic
interest and Republican advantage? Moral foundations theory, first developed by Haidt and
Joseph (2007), suggests that liberals and conservatives rely on different moral foundations.
Important to moral foundations theory is its distinction between types of moral thinking. Moral
judgment concerns normative distinctions regarding the actions and character of a person;
judgments are made with respect to a set of virtues held as obligatory by a culture or a
subculture. Haidt further distinguishes between moral reasoning and moral intuition. The key
difference between the two is consciousness: moral reasoning is conscious, effortful, and
intentional, while moral intuition involves no conscious awareness of the process endured in
order to reach a decision.
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Haidt (2008) defines moral systems as “interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions,
and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and
make social life possible.” There are two main kinds of moral systems. The individualizing
approach focuses on the individual as the locus of moral value, and seeks to suppress selfishness
by “protecting individuals directly through teaching individuals to respect the rights of other
individuals” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1030). On the other hand, the binding approach focuses on
groups and institutions as mechanisms to suppress selfishness through “binding individuals into
roles and duties in order to constrain their imperfect natures” (Graham et. al, 2009, p. 1030).
Moral foundations theory focuses on five foundations. Two of these fall within the
individualizing foundation: harm/care, and fairness/reciprocity. The harm/care foundation
involves basic concerns for the suffering of others, sensitivity to cruelty and harm, and virtues of
caring and compassion. The fairness/reciprocity foundation includes “concerns about unfair
treatment, inequality, and abstract notions of justice” (Graham et al., 2009). The remaining three
foundations fall within the binding foundation: ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and
purity/sanctity. Ingroup/loyalty involves obligations of group membership, with virtues including
loyalty, patriotism, and vigilance against betrayal and dissent. Authority/respect concerns the
social order and obligations of hierarchical relationships; virtues include obedience, respect, and
proper role fulfillment. Purity/sanctity involves physical and spiritual contagion, with a focus on
chastity, wholesomeness, and control of desires (Graham et al., 2009).
The individualizing foundation—harm/care, and fairness/reciprocity—forms the basis of
a liberal philosophy focused on the rights and welfare of individuals. Liberals promote social
justice, defined by Haidt as “the extension of morality to the societal level,” with a particular
emphasis on advancing justice and individual welfare (Graham & Haidt, 2007). Conservatives
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base their worldview on the binding foundations—ingroup, authority, and purity. Conservatives
focus on protection of institutions, traditions, and divinity. Because of this, conservatism
provides a form of motivated social cognition, which functions to reduce fear and uncertainty,
avoid change and disruption, and explain, order, and justify inequality among groups and
individuals (Jost, 2003; Pratto, 1994).
Gutmann (2001) suggests that the “essential element of all forms of liberalism is
individual liberty.” Liberals hold an “unconstrained vision,” characterized by optimism regarding
human nature, and a preference for people to be left as free as possible. Conservatives on the
other hand hold a “constrained vision” of social issues and are more pessimistic regarding human
nature; they have a preference for strong institutions and traditions as a means of constraining
inherently selfish human nature. Likewise, Muller (1997) suggests that conservatives are
motivated by opposing challenges to authority and institutions presented by liberals.
Conservatives have strong emotional sensitivity to threats to the social order and are driven by
two core elements: resistance to change, and acceptance of inequality (Jost et. al., 2003).
Given these foundations, how entrenched or persuadable are people regarding their
decisions? One motivating factor is the defense motivation, which holds that individuals aim to
hold attitudes that are congruent with existing self-definitional attitudes and beliefs (Chaiken,
Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). Self-identifying conservatives, therefore, are encouraged to
maintain their binding foundations, while liberals are encouraged to maintain their
individualizing foundations. Likewise, individuals hold coherence motives, which encourage
individuals to avoid cognitive dissonance through aligning their thinking and beliefs to avoid
internal contradictions (Haidt, 2001).
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Opinions may be altered due to the reasoned persuasion link in which individuals
verbalize moral reasoning to justify their moral judgment to another, but this persuasive effect is
rare. Because moral positions always contain an affective component, reasoned persuasion is
most likely to succeed not when an individual provides a logically compelling argument, but
when the persuader triggers new affectively valenced intuitions in the listener (Haidt, 2001). One
common barrier to persuasion is the “wag the other dog’s tail illusion,” which describes a
situation in which both sides expect the other to be receptive to altering their opinion after
reasoning without recognizing the influence of moral motivations on either side (Haidt & Hersh,
2001). Another situation in which persuasion is unlikely to succeed is when both sides begin
with strongly felt opposing intuitions. In this case, reasoned persuasion is unlikely to change the
other party’s mind, and may even lead to greater attitude polarization (Haidt, 2001; Lord, Ross,
and Lepper, 1979).
III. Moral Foundations in the Senate Arena
How might the existing literature in moral foundations theory play out on the Senate
floor? On the most basic level, moral foundations theory supplies a set of expectations for what
may motivate each party. Broadly, Democrats can be expected to be motivated by the
individualizing foundations and participate in legislation that reduces harm and advances justice.
I expect Democrats to promote social justice legislation, which seeks to maximize the welfare
and rights of individuals. Likewise, Democratic legislation may focus in particular on those who
do not receive equal treatment or full justice in society (Graham & Haidt, 2007). Democrats may
be especially sensitive to violations of the harm foundation, and may therefore prioritize
legislation focused on victims of crime or reducing punitive prison practices (such as mandatory
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life sentences, or prison conditions for juveniles). In promoting the care foundation, Democrats
may focus legislation on rehabilitation measures. Given liberals’ unconstrained vision,
Democratic legislation can be expected to focus less on criminalizing more activities.
On the other hand, Republicans can be expected to participate in legislation which
supports the binding foundations. In practice, this means I expect Republicans to advance
legislation focusing on the strengthening of pre-existing institutions—such as funding and
protections for law enforcement, the F.B.I, and criminal courts, to name a few. Because of
conservatives’ “positional ideology,” Republicans may particularly support bills strengthening
institutions when Democrats hold majority shares of power in Congress, or hold the presidency.
Given the conservative constrained vision and emphasis on control of desires, I expect
Republicans to support bills which further criminalize deviant behavior, such as drug use.
Likewise, conservative desire to maintain the social order may encourage Republicans to support
legislation which limits liberties in order to defend social order, such as anti-terrorism
surveillance bills. I expect Republicans to be sensitive to violations of the binding foundations
and be more punitive than their Democratic colleagues (Silver & Silver, 2016). Bills of interest
to Republicans may therefore focus on increasing penalties for committing crimes, such as
mandatory minimum sentences and “three-strike” rules.
Given these expectations, I expect high partisan margins when bills fall solidly in support
of one party’s intuition and in opposition to the other party’s. An example of this could be a bill
seeking to institute harsh mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile felony offenders. Binding
foundations and a preference for punishment would motivate Republicans to support the bill,
while violations of the care foundation would drive Democrats to oppose it. Because violations
of the fairness foundation were found to be the most taboo across party identification, tradeoffs
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between the party’s interests may be likely when a bill seeks to correct a fairness violation
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).
I expect that bipartisan margins are most likely to occur in one of three situations. First,
when a bill effectively balances the foundational motivations of each party. For example, a crime
bill that seeks to both reduce fear and uncertainty—appealing to Republicans—as well as reduce
harm—appealing to Democrats. Second, when a bill utilizes coherence motives to build a
bipartisan coalition. In this case, the focus of the bill would have to create an uncomfortable
cognitive dissonance, which would lead to a defense motivation. The Senator would therefore
adjust the attitude towards the bill in order to remain congruent with self-definitional beliefs.
One example of this could be a Republican choosing to join a Democratic-sponsored bill that
seeks to strengthen institutions. Third, when a bill triggers new affectively valenced intuitions.
This last situation may have a particular sensitivity to major events occurring beyond the Senate
walls. Take, for instance, a mass shooting which results in a major swell of affect, which
overrides a Republican’s resistance to infringing on the second amendment and instead triggers
the desire to reduce fear and anxiety by enacting some element of gun control. On the opposite
side, after a domestic terrorist attack, Democrats may be motivated by affect which triggers their
desire to reduce harm in a way that overrides their desire for people to be left as free as possible
and leads them to support a bill constraining civil liberties.
IV.  Methodology: Subcategory Analysis
As previously mentioned, I utilized the Library of Congress’s provided policy area filter
for “crime and law enforcement” in order to collect the data for this analysis. Based on bill
summaries authored by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Services, I created 18
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subcategories within the Library of Congress’ crime and law enforcement category. These
subcategories were then reliability tested with another coder. I created a set of 50 randomly
selected bills and distributed this set to the other coder, along with a codebook describing each
subcategory. I then compared the other coder’s findings with my own (Krippendorff’s alpha =
.63). In an effort to reach a higher level of reliability, I made adjustments to the codebook, then
conducted a second round of reliability coding with another set of 50 randomly selected bills.
After this, reliability was strengthened (Krippendorff’s alpha = .86). From there, I classified the
remaining bills for one primary subcategory.
V. Subcategory Analysis
The sub-categories with the highest amount of bills included criminal justice reform (58),
drugs and gangs (50), juveniles and children (49), and law enforcement and policing (46). These
four categories accounted for nearly half of all crime and law bills (47%). Patterns in the
amounts of these subcategories of bills introduced each session varied greatly. Not
unsurprisingly, the highwater marks for the most bills per subcategory introduced tended to
coincide with major U.S. or global events. Terrorism bills, for instance, saw their highest number
introduced in the session following the 9/11 attacks, the 107th session (2001-2003), and the
109th session (2005-2007). As growing numbers of households began to learn how to use the
internet, cyber law bills reached their highwater mark in the 105th and 106th sessions
(1997-2001), roughly the same year as the Census Bureau first collected data about household
internet use [Table 2.1].2
Some subcategories received consistent interest over sessions. This was the case for bills
relating to juveniles/children and criminal justice reform, which were the only subcategories to
2 https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/acs/ACS-39.pdf
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have at least one bill introduced every session. Similarly, senators introduced at at least one
guns/weapons bill every session except the 109th (2005-2007). Other subcategories seemed to
have marked rises and plateaus in interest. Interest in bills relating to counterfeit/copyright and
fraud seems to have plateaued in recent years, with 0 bills introduced on these topics since the
112th session (2011-2013). On the other hand, drug/gang-related bills had 0 bills introduced for
three straight sessions (102nd-104th), yet saw at least 2 drug/gang-related bills for the next 11
sessions that followed (105th-115th). Likewise, senators introduced 0 law enforcement/policing
bills from the 101th session to the 104th session (1989-1997), then at least 2 bills introduced
every session since, with the exception of the 109th session (2005-2007).
Total success rate of each subcategory ranged greatly. The average success rate for all
subcategories with at least 10 bills introduced in this time period was 24%. Three subcategories
emerge with the highest total success rates: federal agencies (40%), crimes against protected
groups (38.9%), and law enforcement/policing (33%). Federal agencies and law
enforcement/policing align closely with the authority/institutions foundation, but crimes against
protected groups aligns more with the harm/care foundation. The subcategories with the lowest
total success rates were guns/weapons (6.1%), cyberlaw (10%), and GBV/IPV (14.3%).
Guns/weapons may have had lower success due strongly felt opposing intuitions from both
parties. For Democrats, gun control bills aim to reduce harm from gun violence; for Republicans,
gun control bills are liberal challenges to the authority/institutions foundation.
As previously mentioned in Chapter I, the Senate often seemed to focus on one issue for
a session, then, having spent all political capital on the issue, focused elsewhere the next session.
There was some evidence to support this idea in success rates by subcategory: for instance,
successful sessions for bills relating to juveniles and children were always followed by sessions
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in which no bills related to juveniles/children passed. While this was not the case for every
subcategory, large percentage changes in success rates between sessions were common for many
of the subcategories [Table 2.1].
Table 2.1 Crime and Law Subcategories
VI.  Bipartisanship in Crime and Law Subcategories
Beyond the sponsorship level, cosponsor data provides important context to patterns in
party participation in the subcategories. GBV/IPV bills had the highest average amount of total
cosponsors (22.6), followed by crimes against protected groups (18.7), and law
enforcement/policing (14.7). The bills that attracted the highest average amount of Democratic
cosponsors were the same: GBV/IPV (15.8), crimes against protected groups (13.8), and law
enforcement/policing (9.5). For Republicans, the top three categories with the highest average
Republican cosponsors were juveniles/children (7.1), GBV/IPV (6.9), and criminal justice
reform (5.2). The Average Cosponsor Partisan Difference (ACPD) overall leaned Democratic at
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.23. The three most bipartisan subcategories in terms of ACPD were juveniles/children (.04),
theft (-.04), and counterfeit/copyright (-.06).
Table 2.2 Crime and Law Subcategories: Cosponsorship
Figure 2.1
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Trends in bipartisanship within the subcategories over time is quite varied. Some
subcategories, like law enforcement and policing, see high CPD one session in favor of one
party, then high CPD favoring the opposite party in the next session. Other subcategories’ CPD
increases in favor of one party gradually, hits a peak, and incites a reaction from the other party,
resulting in a steep movement towards the opposite party in the next session. This was the case
for CPD for drugs/gangs, which steadily trended Democratic for the majority of sessions 109 to
114. Democratic CPD peaked in session 114 at .62, then fell to .01 in session 115.
VII. Issue Ownership in Crime & Law Subcategories
One way to examine party interest in each of the subcategories is through analyzing
sponsorship data. Democrats sponsored the most bills related to drugs/gangs (33), criminal
justice reform (30), and guns/weapons (26). The three subcategories that Democrats sponsored
the least were counterfeit/copyright (6), theft (9), terrorism (10), crimes against protected groups
(10), and fraud (10). For Republicans, the top three subcategories sponsored were criminal
justice reform (28), juveniles/children (23), and law enforcement/policing (21). The
subcategories with the fewest Republican sponsors included theft (2), fraud (3), cyberlaw (7),
and guns/weapons (7) [Table 2.2].
The previous discussion of issue ownership concerned the treatment of crime and law
legislation as a whole. With the subcategories, a more nuanced consideration can be given to
whether the parties lay claim to different subcategories within the broad category of crime and
lawn legislation. Given the variation in amounts of bills in each subcategory, percentages of bills
sponsored by each party may give a more complete answer to this question. Democrats
sponsored more than half of all the bills in all subcategories, with the exception of
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counterfeit/copyright. Democrats sponsored the largest majorities in the theft subcategory
(81.8%), guns/weapons (78.8%), and fraud (76.9%). Republicans sponsored the largest majority
in counterfeit/copyright (57.1%), and sponsored less than 50% of all other subcategories [Figure
2.1].
Table 2.3 Crime and Law Subcategories: Party Ownership
Figure 2.2
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Because sheer amount of bills sponsored does not necessarily indicate success, a further
look at success rates by party aids in this examination. Of Democratic-sponsored bills passed
into law, Democrats had the most bills in the drugs/gangs (8), juveniles/children (7), federal
agencies (6), and law enforcement/policing (6) subcategories. In terms of shares of a subcategory
that were most successful, Democrats had the highest share of their federal agencies (60%), other
(35.7%), crimes against protected groups (30%), and fraud (30%) bills passed into law. The least
successful shares of subcategories for Democrats included GBV/IPV (0%), counterfeit/copyright
(0%), and guns/weapons (3.8%). Compared to Republicans, Democrats had the largest
Comparative Partisan Success (CPS) over federal agencies (.35), theft (.22), and other (.19) bills
[Table 2.3].
The highest amounts of successful Republican-sponsored bills were in the law
enforcement/policing (11), juveniles/children (8), and criminal justice reform (7) subcategories.
Republicans had the highest share of their law enforcement/policing (52.4%), crimes against
protected groups (44.4%), and terrorism (42.9%) bills passed into law; and the lowest shares
passed of their theft (0%), cyberlaw (11.1%), and guns/weapons bills (14.3%). Compared to
Democrats, Republicans had the largest CPS margins over counterfeit/copyright (-.38),
GBV/IPV (-.36), and terrorism (-.35) [Table 2.3].
Table 2.4 Crime and Law Subcategories: Partisan Success Rates
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* CPS refers to “Comparative Partisan Success”
VIII. Methodology: Moral Foundations Theory Analysis
While the subcategories were created with a focus on distinguishing qualities of each
crime or group of focus, some of the subcategories lend particularly well to the five moral
foundations. Crimes against protected groups, GBV/IPV, and human trafficking bills most often
relate to the harm/care foundation; bills seeking to criminalize abortion often relate to the
purity/sanctity foundation. Other subcategories may align with moral foundations or stand in
opposition to the moral foundation, depending on the content within the bill. This may be the
case for criminal justice reform bills: those bills which seek to strengthen the institutions inherent
to the criminal justice system will align with the binding foundations, while other bills within
this subcategory may seek to reform and limit the powers of these institutions. A similar case
might be made for the federal agencies and law enforcement/policing subcategories. The
juveniles/children subcategory may at first seem to align closely with the harm/care foundation,
but this again depends on the content of the bill. Some juveniles/children bills may seek to
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protect children from being victims of crime, while others might focus on punishment for
juvenile offenders.
In order to address this possible variation, I focused on the harm/care foundation. Within
the top subcategories for each party, I coded the successful bills for at least one instance of
increased punishment. I considered a bill to have an instance of increased punishment if a bill
included measures such as increased mandatory minimums, expansion of criminalized activities
or substances, and reduced ability for early release from prison, among others. In order to
address the potential for variation within the juveniles/children and criminal justice reform
categories, I further split these subcategories into additional secondary subcategories. I coded the
juveniles/children subcategory with two main secondary subcategories: crimes committed by
juveniles (juvenile criminal offenders), and crimes committed against juveniles (juvenile victims
of crime). I coded the criminal justice reform bills as pre-conviction (sentencing guidelines,
habeas corpus rules, bail requirements, etc.), post-conviction (post-conviction release
requirements, restrictions on prisoner possessions, implementation of the death penalty, etc.) or
general (includes regulations related to both pre- and post-conviction).
IX. Moral Foundations Theory in Crime & Law Subcategories
Even keeping in mind the variation possible within the subcategories, some surprising
patterns arise in partisan sponsorship across the subcategories. For instance, Democrats
sponsored 66% of all drug/gang bills, and drug/gang bills accounted for Democrats’ subcategory
with the highest amount of successful bills. This is unexpected because moral foundations theory
would predict that this subcategory would be owned by Republicans; preventing or punishing
drug use seems to align most closely to the purity/sanctity foundation. Furthermore, moral
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foundations theory would predict that Democrats would favor measures within bills which seek
to reduce harm rather than increase punishment. However, 62.5% of successful
Democratic-sponsored drug/gang bills contained measures seeking to increase punishment, and
50% contained harm reduction measures.
Instances of provisions of increased punishment in Democratic-sponsored drug/gang bills
include Senator Joe Biden’s (D-DE) Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, which broadened the
definition of “anabolic steroids” and advocated for increased penalties for crimes involving
anabolic steroids; and Senator Dianne Feinstein’s (D-CA) Transnational Drug Trafficking Act of
2015, which “broaden[ed] the scope of persons subject to criminal prosecution for manufacturing
or distributing a controlled substance.” On the other hand, one example of a
Democratic-sponsored bill seeking to reduce harm is Senator Sheldon Whitehouse’s (D-RI)
Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, which included a provision directing HHS
to “award grants to expand access to drugs or devices approved by the FDA for emergency
treatment of opioid overdose (e.g., naloxone).” Another notable feature is that 50% of all
successful Democratic-sponsored drug/gang bills passed in the 111th session, suggesting a period
of combined intense party focus and concentrated party success in passing bills related to this
issue.
Democrats also had the highest amount of federal agencies bills passed into law. This is
also unexpected: moral foundations theory predicts that Republicans would be the ones inclined
to sponsor bills focused on strengthening institutions. Some Democratic-sponsored federal
agency bills did in fact focus on strengthening institutions; this was the case for Sheldon
Whitehouse’s (D-RI) Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012, which expanded
the role that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security may play in
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investigations of mass killings. Three bills focused exclusively on extending pre-existing terms
of key figures in criminal justice-related institutions.3 No bills seemed to focus exclusively on
narrowing the role or strength of institutions, though two bills did require that hires of the FBI
and DHS pass polygraph tests prior to being hired.4
Democrats were successful in passing 7 juveniles/children bills into law. All of the
successful Democratic bills fell within the crimes committed against juveniles category,
accounting for a success rate in this secondary subcategory of 43.8%. Some of these bills
centered on offenders of crimes against juveniles, including increasing punishment for those who
fail to pay child support and increased requirements for sex offenders.5 Other bills focused on
juvenile victims of crime, such as one bill which established a National Strategy for Child
Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction.6 A third category centered on oversight or requirements
for related institutions, such as the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency and the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children.7 The 110th session was particularly prolific: 57.1%
of all successful Democratic bills in this subcategory passed in the 110th session. This may
indicate a high degree of party focus on the issue in the 110th session.
Democrats also had 6 successful law enforcement/policing bills. These bills fell into two
broad categories: situational and operational. The first situational bill focused on transportation
of violent criminals; the second situational bill established the “Blue Alert,” for the “serious
7 Coons, Christopher. Victims of Child Abuse Act Reauthorization Act of 2013. S.1799; Leahy, Patrick. Protect our
Children First Act of 2007. S.1829
6 Biden, Joseph. PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008. S.1738.
5 Shelby, Richard. Child Support Recovery Act of 1992. S.1002; Schumer, Charles. KIDS Act of 2008. S.431.
4 Leahy, Patrick. FBI Reform Act of 2002. S.1974; Pryor, Mark. Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010. S.3243.
3 Joe Biden’s A bill to amend section 992 of title 28, United States Code, to provide a member of the United States
Sentencing Commission whose term has expired may continue to serve until a successor is appointed or until the
expiration of the next session of Congress (S.1963); Carl Levin’s Independent Counsel Authorization Act of 1994
(S.24), and Patrick Leahy’s A Bill to extend the term of the incumbent Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (S.1103).
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injury or death of a law enforcement officer in the line of duty,” or “an officer who is missing in
connection with the officer's official duties.” The operational bills were fairly varied across
topics of bulletproof vest grants, and which officers were included in mandatory training
requirements, among others.
Perhaps most notable within the successful Democratic-sponsored law enforcement and
policing bills are two bills which seem to fall squarely within the binding foundations. Firstly,
Patrick Leahy’s (D-VT) Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act Improvements Act of 2010
centered around expanding the officers eligible to carry a concealed firearm. Though Leahy did
include a provision calling for proper training and mental health requirements, strengthening the
institution of the police through expanding firearm usage toes onto the issue area expected of
Republicans. Secondly, Patrick Leahy’s Mychal Judge, Police, and Fire Chaplains Public Safety
Officers’ Benefit Act of 2002 focused on including “chaplains killed in the line of duty among
persons who qualify to receive public safety officer death benefits.” Such a religiously focused
bill would be expected to fall within the conservative purity/sanctity foundation.
Law enforcement and policing was also a successful subcategory for Republicans,
accounting for their subcategory with the highest number of successful bills. A few of these bills
were quite similar to successful bills sponsored by Democrats, including a bill seeking to expand
eligibility of officers who could carry a concealed firearm and bills focused on bulletproof vest
grants.8 Another successful Republican bill sought to expand the role of police officers through
establishing “school resource officers who operate in and around elementary and secondary
schools to combat school-related crime and disorder problems, gangs, and drug activities.”9
9 Campbell, Ben. A bill to amend part Q of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to encourage
the use of school resource officers. S.2235
8 Campbell, Ben. Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2003. S.253; Campbell, Ben. Bulletproof Vest Partnership
Grant Act of 1998. S.1605; Campbell, Ben. Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Act of 2000. S.2413.
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One strategy that seemed successful with these Repbulican bills was linking law
enforcement and policing with other popular conservative issues, such as Ben Campbell’s
(R-CO) bill expanding concealed carry among police officers, and John Cornyn’s (R-TX) bill
extending COPS grants for “active shooter training programs.”10 Other bills displayed
conservative’s preference for increasing punishment, such as Gordon Smith’s (R-OR) Federal
Judiciary Protection Act of 2001, which increased penalties for assaulting, resisting, threatening,
or impeding a federal law enforcement official.11 On the other side, however, George Voinovich’s
(R-OH) Federal Law Enforcement Pay and Benefits Parity Act of 2003 called for a study on pay
and benefit disparities among federal law enforcement officers, which seems to reside under the
fairness/reciprocity foundation crucial to liberals.
Republicans were also successful in passing juveniles/children bills. Republicans both
sponsored the most and passed the most bills in the crimes against juveniles subcategory. With 6
crimes against juveniles bills passed into law, Republicans passed 40% of all crimes against
juveniles bills they sponsored. Some of these bills focused on punishment for offenders of crimes
against juveniles. One example is the PROTECT Act, which increased mandatory minimum
sentences for offenders convicted of federal sex offense crimes against minors. Others focused
mainly on protection for juvenile victims, like one bill outlining procedures for determining the
amount of restitution due in child pornography cases.12 Several bills focused on the institutions
involved in investigations for juvenile victims of crime, such as liability protections for the
Center for Missing and Exploited Children; and grants for children’s advocacy centers (CACs),
which aid in coordinating responses to child abuse.13 Interestingly, Republicans passed all of
13 Hatch, Orin. A bill to amend the Protect Act to clarify certain volunteer liability. S.1280; Blunt, Roy. Victims of
Child Abuse Act Reauthorization Act of 2018. S.2961.
12 Hatch, Orin. Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018. S.2152.
11 Smith, Gordon. Federal Judiciary Protection Act of 2001. S.1099.
10 Campbell, Ben. Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2003. S.253; Cornyn, John. Protecting Our Lives by
Initiating COPS Expansion Act of 2016. S.2840.
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their successful juveniles/children bills in either the 108th session (3 bills) or the 115th session (5
bills). This suggests a degree of concentrated party focus on this topic.
Republicans also passed 7 criminal justice reform bills; 3 of these bills focused on
general criminal justice reform, 3 focused on mental health, and 1 focused on post-conviction.
The general bills focused on a wide range of issues from technology and information systems
improvements, to restitution for victims of crime, to backlogs in rape kits, among others.14 The
aforementioned First Step Act of 2018 was among this category, which included provisions like
reduced mandatory minimum sentences and an Independent Review Committee to study
recidivism. The one bill focused on post-conviction required that federal prisoners pay a fee for
most health care services.15 The mental health bills centered on procedures and services for
mentally ill offenders, such as grants which sought to expand the use of mental health courts, and
specialized training for justice agency officers in identifying and responding to mental illness
symptoms, among others.16 The success of this secondary subcategory is particularly interesting:
it aligns closely with the harm/care foundation associated with liberals, yet Republicans
sponsored 71.4% of all mental health bills and succeeded in passing 60% of these bills.
X. Discussion
Consideration of party issue ownership within subcategories of crime and law legislation
provides important context to the discussion of applications of moral foundations theory to the
Senate floor. While I expected Democrats and Republicans to self-sort into their respective moral
foundations through sponsorship patterns, instead I found notable divergence from traditional
16 Dewine, Mike. America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project. S.1865; DeWine, Mike. Mentally Ill
Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004. S.1194; DeWine, Mike. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and
Crime Reduction Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2008. S.2304.
15 Kyl, Jon. Federal Prisoner Health Care Copayment Act of 2000. S.704.
14 Dewine, Mike. Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998. S.2022; Cornyn, John. Justice for All
Reauthorization Act of 2016. S.2577; Sullivan, Dan. First Step Act of 2018. S.756.
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moral psychology. Democrats sponsored the most bills in drugs/gangs, a subcategory I predicted
would be owned by Republicans due to their constrained vision and purity/sanctity foundations.
This apparent inconsistency may be explained by framing, which is the deliberate selection of
some features of information in order to raise their salience in a message (Entman, 1993).
Democrats may frame drugs/gangs bills to be harm/care bills by focusing on the potential harm
caused by drug use or gang violence. Increased criminalization or punishment in drug/gang bills
may therefore be framed as consistent with liberals’ moral foundations.
The idea of framing might also be relevant in highlighting a limitation of applying moral
foundations theory. While I focused primarily on the harm/care foundation through looking at
instances of punitive measures in bills, which foundation each subcategory falls within may be
dependent on framing. For example, a bill seeking to establish a strict mandatory minmum for
offenders of child pornography would, under my coding scheme, be considered a punitive
measure. This same measure, however, could be considered as reducing harm, if instead framed
as reducing the harm felt by the victim of the crime. Further work in this area could focus on
ways in which to increase consistency in coding each foundation.
There appeared a pattern of issue ownership on the individual senator level. Orin Hatch,
for instance, sponsored 57.1% of all successful Republican-sponsored juveniles/children bills
and passed 3 successful bills in this subcategory in one session alone. Mike DeWine sponsored
60% of all successful criminal justice reform bills focused on mental health. Among successful
Democratic-sponsored bills, Patrick Leahy (D-VT) sponsored 57.1% of general criminal justice
reform bills, and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) sponsored 37.5% of all successful drugs/gangs bills.
Some Democratic senators, like Patrick Leahy and Joe Biden (D-DE), also showed particular
interest in increasing punishment, seemingly in opposition to the harm/care foundation. One
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possible explanation for why Leahy and Biden may favor punishment relates to the moral
foundations subgroup of a religious left, which favors values authority/institutions to a higher
extent than secular liberals (Graham & Joseph, 2009). Because Leahy and Biden are both devout
Catholics, they may be among this subgroup of liberals.
Why do Democrats demonstrate such divergence from their expected moral foundations?
It is important to underscore that the aforementioned bills are successful ones; meaning, these
bills were able to garner enough support from both parties, or enough united support from the
party in power, in order to pass into law. In the former case, senators make mental calculations to
determine if there are enough appealing elements of the bill in order to justify supporting a bill
from the opposite party. Democrats may therefore intentionally include provisions they know
will appeal to Republicans in order to garner support from the opposite side of the aisle. One
example of this could be Joe Biden’s (D-DE) Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, which
included punitive provisions such as increased penalties for anabolic steroid possession; perhaps
because of this, Biden’s bill drew more Republican cosponsors than Democratic cosponsors.
Bills which strike a balance between provisions appealing to both parties tend to be omnibus
bills with many titles.
Another successful strategy for garnering support from the opposite party appears to be
not striking a balance between appealing provisions for each party, but rather avoiding
controversial elements altogether. These bills tend to be narrowly focused on the
non-controversial issue, like Patrick Leahy’s (D-VT) bill amending the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to allow railroad officers to attend the FBI National Academy for
law enforcement training and dispersed no funds for the measure.
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There was a high amount of “crossing over” into the opposite party’s expected area of
focus. Successful Democratic bills may focus on issues traditionally associated with the
conservative foundations due to a perceived issue ownership by Republicans, or this may simply
be an indication of the big tent nature of the Democratic party. Republicans also expressed more
of an interest in the harm/care foundation than expected, such as their success in passing mental
health bills and the high share of their GBV/IPV bills passed, but were also reliably interested
and successful in passing bills related to the binding foundations.
Overall, due to the high degree of variation within each party, these results may provide
support for the 4 cluster moral foundations scale described by Graham and Joseph (2009) over
the binary liberals/conservatives model.
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Chapter III: Social Contagion Theory &
Senate Collaboration Networks
I. Intro
The previous chapter found a high degree of variation within parties, as well as some
indicators of senator-level issue ownership. These findings underscore the need to consider the
Senate beyond the dichotomy of the two parties and instead consider the Senate as a network of
individuals who collaborate, compete, and influence each other.
Notable in moral foundations theory is its social model, which emphasizes the
importance of social and cultural influences. Moral reasoning is an interpersonal process, highly
attuned to the emergence of group norms and can elicit outward conformity (Haidt, 2001). This
chapter will explore the influence of party outliers and how they may help facilitate
bipartisanship within Senate networks.
II. Social Contagion Theory
How do ideas or behaviors catch on within a network? The crucial unit of networks is
interpersonal ties. Strong interpersonal ties are characterized by time, emotional intensity, and
reciprocal services (Granovetter, 1973). People within a network feel strong psychological
pressures to align their feelings and beliefs with those of their strong ties in order to avoid
cognitive dissonance (Granovetter, 1973). However, networks are not made up of only strong
ties. Here it is useful to define between two types of networks: effective networks and extended
networks. Effective networks interact most regularly and in the most depth and are therefore
made up of strong ties. Extended networks account for the weak ties which make up the
remainder of the network (Epstein, 1969).
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Granovetter (1973) argues that ideas can diffuse more effectively through weak ties than
strong ties. This is because weak ties are more likely to be formed between socially distant actors
with few network neighbors in common, and therefore provide access to new information that
would have otherwise been sequestered in a distant portion of the network (Granovetter, 1973).
One way this is accomplished is through bridges, which are lines in a network which provide the
only path between individual A and individual B. Bridges serve as the only pathway for
information or influence to flow from individual A to any of individual B’s connections (Haray,
Norman, Cartwright, 1965).
After ideas move within a network, there are two primary models for how they catch. In a
simple contagion, repeated contact with a single individual can be sufficient for transmission of
ideas. In a complex contagion, transmission requires social reinforcement from multiple contacts,
rather than just repeated contact with one individual. Contagions are most likely to be complex
when the idea is perceived as costly or difficult, or is accompanied by a need for social
legitimation or credibility (Centola and Macy, 2007). Whether or not an idea is adopted also
relates to collective action theory. Olson (1965) points to a fundamental startup problem: as the
number of individuals needed to produce a collective good increases, the value of any single
individual’s contribution declines. Therefore, barring any additional incentives, rational
individuals will choose not to contribute (Olson, 1965). Critical mass theory provides a
counterargument: because contributions to collective action can result in positive externalities,
initial contributions can create a bandwagon effect that mobilizes larger populations (Marwell
and Oliver, 1993).
Granovetter (1978) focuses on binary decision making wherein there are two distinct and
mutually exclusive choices. These decisions have a positive side—choosing to do
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something—and a negative side—choosing not to do something (Granovetter, 1978). Buried
within the perceived costs and benefits of choosing to do something are how many others have
already chosen to do something themselves. Likewise, according to McCullen (2013),
individuals make decisions based on personal preference, the average of the preferences of
nearby individuals in their network, and the global average of preferences. In practice,
individuals construct a “threshold,” a point where the perceived benefits of the positive side
exceed the perceived costs (Granovetter 1978, pg. 1422). Each individual has a threshold for
cooperating: if individual A requires 10 other people to join before she does (a threshold of 10),
she will join if 10 people have already joined, but she will not join if fewer than 10 people have
joined. Related is the idea of a critical mass, which is the gap between no cooperation and the
“level of cooperation at which the growth of participation becomes self-sustaining” (Centola,
2013, pg. 7).
The composition of groups influences how ideas catch. Centola (2013) argues that
homophily supports the growth rate of social movements because deviant behavior requires
affirmation by like minded peers that protects against normative backlash. However, very high
levels of homophily may ultimately slow the transmission of ideas because it impedes collective
action from spreading beyond only one portion of the network (Centola, 2013). Because of this,
two types of actors within a network are crucial: radicals and instigators. Radicals have low
thresholds and perceive the costs of participating as low. Instigators have extremely low
thresholds to the point that they are willing to participate even if they are the first to do so
(Granovetter, 1978).
III.  Social Contagion in the Senate Arena
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Bill cosponsorship most likely requires a complex contagion influenced by
threshold-based decision making on the individual senator level. Firstly, the decision to
cosponsor is most likely a complex contagion because it requires social reinforcement and
legitimation from several party members, and may be costly or difficult if it goes against party
expectations. Secondly, each Senator likely has their own threshold for cosponsorship on a bill
sponsored by the opposite party. For example, Senator X likely has in mind how many members
of his own party would have to have joined a bill sponsored by the opposite party before Senator
X himself joins. Critical mass theory likely applies here as well because bipartisan bill
cosponsorship may generate positive externalities, such as reciprocal support on future bills.
Decision making in the Senate is a combination of personal and party preferences.
Applying McCullen’s (2013) principles of decision making, before signing onto a bill senators
must consider their personal preferences, such as their policy priorities or campaign promises;
the average of their allies in the Senate; and the overall preference of their party. The decision to
cosponsor is a binary decision: the positive side is joining the bill as a cosponsor; the negative
side is not joining.
When thinking of the Senate as a network, there are several ways to conceptualize
effective vs extended networks. Effective networks may be each party, with their extended
networks including members of the opposite party with whom they sometimes collaborate.
Because this thesis is focused on one issue area, the effective network may be the judiciary
committee, with the extended network including other interested Senators who do not sit on the
committee themselves. Overall, strong ties are more likely to be held between members of the
same party, and weak ties more likely to be held with members of the opposite party.
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The benefit and the risk of homophilous networks is particularly relevant to bill
cosponsorship. Party networks tend to be homophilous, so a bill sponsored by a prominent
member of one party may benefit from homophily in the spread of influence to other members of
the same party, therefore drawing in many same party cosponsors. However, the degree of
homophily of a party network may hinder a bill’s success if the bill is unable to reach the
extended network needed to garner support of the opposite party. Instigator and radical senators
are therefore crucial because their low thresholds enable them to be early cosponsors, which may
have a bandwagon effect drawing on more members of their party.
IV.  Methodology: Conceptualizing Radicals and Instigators
In order to operationalize instigators and radicals, I divided Cosponsor Partisan
Difference (CPD) by quartiles and looked at the bills with the highest partisan leaning in either
direction. This resulted in a set of 207 bills in various stages of success: 106 bills with highest
Republican partisanship, and 101 bills with highest Democratic partisanship. I coded all senators
who were cosponsors on bills with the highest partisanship of the opposite party as radicals.
From there, I used the Library of Congress’ asterisk distinction, which indicates an original
cosponsor to define “instigator.” Using this distinction, I coded all senators on a binary scale of
instigator, or not an instigator, depending on whether or not they were original cosponsors. See




V.  Radical & Instigator Senators
I had two main expectations prior to these calculations. First, I expected the instigator and
radical senators to be from swing states, and therefore partner with the opposite party without the
support of his or her home party in order to appeal to both sides of his or her constituency.
Second, I expected these senators to have many years of experience. More years in the Senate
may translate to both deepened relationships with various senators including those across the
aisle, as well as a degree of electoral safety which may incentivize riskier behavior.
Overall, there were many more Democratic radicals than Republican radicals. 73
Democrats at least twice cosponsored bills with the largest Republican majority among
cosponsors; only 15 Republicans joined bills at least twice with the largest Democratic majority
among cosponsors. Top Democratic radicals included Dianne Feinstein (D-CA; 25), Patrick
Leahy (D-VT; 17), and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT; 13) [Figure 3.1]. Top Republican radicals
include Arlen Specter (R-PA; 11), John Chafee (R-RI; 5), Susan Collins (R-ME; 5), Chuck
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Grassley (R-IA; 5), and Olympia Snowe (R-ME; 5) [Figure 3.2]. The most often occurring states
among Democratic radicals were Connecticut with 4 occurrences, and the following states with
3: CA, DE, HI, MA, MN, MD, NJ, NV, and NY. For Republicans, Maine was the top state with 3





Unsurprisingly, the list of instigators from either party was much smaller. There was a
fair amount of overlap between top radicals and top instigators for each party. For Democrats,
top instigators included Dianne Feinstein (13), Patrick Leahy (9), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN; 9),
Joe Biden (D-DE; 7), and Christopher Coons (D-DE; 5). For Republicans, the top instigators
included Arlen Specter (R-PA; 6), John Chafee (R-RI; 4), and Chuck Grassley (R-IA; 4). All the
remaining Republican radicals instigated two or fewer times. From there I gathered information
on the number of years each instigator spent in the Senate before their first instigation (Year
Elected - Year Instigation), and what percentage of their total radical behavior was instigations (#
instigation occurrences / # radical occurrences). The results for both parties are described in chart
## below [Table 3.1].
Table 3.1 Democratic and Republican Instigators
Firstly, the column denoting instigator events as a proportion of total radical behavior
occurrences may elucidate the thresholds for participation of each senator. Senators who have an
extremely high percentage of instigations, like Amy Klobuchar, may have the lowest thresholds
because they most frequently participate in bills with an extremely low number of members from
their own party. On the other hand, senators like Dianne Feinstein who frequently serve as
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instigators but in a low proportion compared to overall radical behavior may have a moderately
higher threshold. Some senators were frequent radicals, but not instigators. This was the case for
Richard Blumenthal, who had the third highest occurrences of radical behavior, but was only an
instigator 4 times. Similarly, Susan Collins had the third highest occurrences of radical behavior
on the Republican side, but only 2 occasions of instigator behavior. Senators like Blumenthal and
Collins may therefore have a threshold for participation that is high enough to impede frequent
instigator behavior.
In terms of states, my predictions were not reflected in the data. In this discussion, it is
helpful to incorporate the Cook Political Report’s Partisan Variable Index (PVI), which measures
“how much more Democratic or Republican a state performs compared to the national
average.”17 Three instigators represented solidly Democratic states—Vermont (PVI: D+15),
California (PVI: D+12), and Rhode Island (PVI: D+10)—and another two Senators represented
Delaware, with a PVI of D+6. By comparison, four instigators represented swing states:
Pennsylvania (PVI: EVEN), Minnesota (PVI: D+1), and Iowa (PVI: R+3). No instigators
represented solidly Republican states. Therefore, there was a fair amount in variation among the
partisan leanings of each state. Two further things are of note among the states represented by the
instigators. First, all the Republican instigators represented swing states (PA, and IA), while just
one Democratic instigator represented a swing state (MN). Secondly, 3 out of 4 of the instigators
from swing states had the highest percentages of instigator events as a proportion of radical
behavior occurrences.  This may suggest that representing a swing state may in fact be associated
with a lower threshold, if the senator is already inclined towards radical behavior.
There was also a wide variety of years of experience at first instigation in the time period
of this study. Some Senators, like Patrick Leahy and Chuck Grassley, rank in the top ten of
17 https://cookpolitical.com/state-pvis
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longest serving senators ever.18 Newer faces to the Senate like Christopher Coons and Sheldon
Whitehouse also ranked highly among top instigators, however. With a two decade range of
years of experience, the data points to the fact that the decision to be an instigator or a radical
may be a personal choice irrespective of number of years in the Senate.
VI.  Subcategories in Radical Participation
Because radical behavior consists of being one of the first members of a party to cross the
aisle and cosponsor on a bill, one might expect that the main subcategories for Republican
radicals rely on Democratic foundations, and vice versa. This was only somewhat true. Radical
behavior among Democrats occurred in all 18 different subcategories, with the highest number of
events occurring in law enforcement/policing (11), and juveniles/children (10). Five radical
behaviors occurred in each criminal justice reform, GBV/IPV, drugs/gangs, and cyber law.
Radical behavior among Republicans was more concentrated across 13 subcategories; top
subcategories included law enforcement/policing (19), criminal justice reform (15), and
GBV/IPV (12). Because law enforcement/policing accounted for the top subcategory for both
parties, there may be something about the subcategory that encourages deviant behavior from





Some instigators focused largely on one subcategory, while others participated more
broadly across subcategories. On the Democratic side, Joe Biden and Dianne Feinstein provide
examples of the latter; Biden participated in 6 different subcategories, and Feinstein participated
in 12 different subcategories. Other Democrats seemed to specialize in subcategories. For both
Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), 50% of all radical bills they
participated on consisted of juveniles/children bills. Similarly, 44.4% of Chris Coons’ radical
bills focused on human trafficking. Democratic instigators overall seemed particularly interested
in subcategories closely related to the harm/care foundation: 48% of all bills with radical
Democratic participation related to harm/care subcategories. The extent to which this was true
varied for each radical. 90% of Amy Klobuchar’s radical bills related to harm/care, while only
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17.6% of Patrick Leahy’s bills did. Leahy instead focused on law enforcement/policing, which
accounted for 41.2% of all his radical participation.
Republican instigators seemed to specialize in one or two subcategories. 66.7% of John
Chafee’s radical bills related to guns/weapons, and 60% of Chuck Grassley’s radical bills related
to drugs/gangs. Arlen Specter focused primarily on criminal justice reform and law
enforcement/policing bills, which accounted for 63.6% of all his radical bills. These two
subcategories align closely with the authority/institutions subcategory typically valued by
Republicans. Perhaps due to the smaller number of Republican instigators, there was less
consistency across the interests of the instigators.
One theory is that senators will engage in radical behavior if the party sponsoring the bill
has a comparative success rate in passing legislation in that subcategory. However, recall from
the previous chapter that Democrats hold a comparative success rate only for federal agencies,
theft, other, and drugs/gangs bills. If Republicans sought to increase their chances of having their
names tied to successful legislation by joining on Democrat-majority bills despite lack of overall
support from their parties, they would therefore only join on bills in those subcategories.
Republicans had 0 occasions of radical behavior on federal agencies and theft bills, 5 for other
category bills, and 4 for drugs/gangs bills. Instead, Republican radicals joined most frequently on
GBV/IPV bills, where Republicans hold their second highest comparative advantage in passing
bills (-.36); policing bills, where Republicans hold their third highest comparative advantage
(-.28); and criminal justice reform, where Republicans also hold a slight comparative advantage
(-.12).
From the opposite side, Democratic radicals’ decision to join Republican-majority bills
seems logical for the opposite reason. Democrats hold a lower comparative advantage in passing
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law enforcement/policing and GBV/IPV bills, so by joining a bill in these area sponsored by
Republicans, Democratic radicals may have a greater chance to be a part of a successful bill.
However, Democratic radicals also participate across subcategories with only slight Republican
comparative advantages (juveniles/children, criminal justice reform, and cyberlaw), as well as in
drugs/gangs, for which Democrats have a slight comparative advantage.
One element that may be contributing to the overlap in subcategories across radicals from
both parties is the relationships between radicals. Because senators often work together for many
years, senators may form relationships with members of the opposite party that might encourage
them to cross the aisle to collaborate. There were 80 repeat relationships between Democratic
cosponsors and Republican cosponsors that collaborated at least twice. The most prolific
cosponsor-sponsor pair was Dianne Feinstein and Orrin Hatch (R-OH), who collaborated 25
times, followed by Richard Blumenthal and Rob Portman (13), Patrick Leahy and Chuck
Grassley (12), and Amy Klobuchar and Orrin Hatch (10). Moreover, Orrin Hatch accounted for
50% of all sponsors in the most prolific Democratic cosponsor-Republican sponsor pairs. There
were only 12 repeat relationships between Republican radicals and Democratic sponsors that
collaborated at least twice. The most common pair was John Chaffee and Howard Metzenbaum,
who collaborated 3 times, then 10 pairs who collaborated twice.
The difference between these two results emphasizes two different strategies for radicals.
Republican radicals seem to focus on a smaller number of subcategories of interest, rather than
on relationships with Democratic sponsors that may draw them towards a bill. Democratic
radicals seem to be drawn to bills based on relationships with Republican sponsors, rather than
on a narrow focus of subcategories. Of course, relationships between radicals of the same party
may draw senators toward supporting bills as well. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) proved an
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influential instigator among Democrats, as she collaborated 6 times with Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
and 6 times with Amy Klobuchar (D-MN). This was the case to a lesser extent for Republican
instigators: Arlen Specter (R-PA) collaborated with John Chaffee 3 times, and Chuck Grassley
(R-IA) twice.
IV.  Methodology: Network Analysis
I conducted four network analyses, one for session 106, 108, 111, and 114. Network
analyses demonstrate connections (called “edges”) between individuals (called “nodes”). In this
case, nodes represent senators, and edges represent relationships through cosponsorship. There
are a few common measures used in network analyses. Density refers to the entirety of the
network; it measures the number of connections that exist, as compared to the total possible
connections that could exist. A density of 1 would indicate that all possible connections are
enacted in the network. Centrality helps identify the most important actor in a network. One
measure of centrality is betweeness, which measures the number of times in which a node falls
on the shortest path between two nodes. Closeness measures the extent to which one node is near
other nodes, and therefore how quickly influence can spread from one node to another.
In order to analyze the role of radicals in these networks, I looked at the top 10 most
frequent radicals from each party. I coded for participation in bill sponsorship and cosponsorship
on a binary scale, only for those senators who were in office at the time of each session in order
to obtain the statistics on frequency of radical participation.
VII. Analyzing Networks in the Senate
On a broader scale, analyzing radicals and instigators is significant because it allows us to
determine the individuals with the lowest thresholds for participation. These senators can serve
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as crucial bridges between party networks and may therefore facilitate bipartisan collaboration.
One way to examine the impact of radicals and instigators is to focus on the most successful
sessions and the relationships that seem to facilitate that success. As mentioned in Chapter I, the
most successful sessions were the 106th, with a success rate of 45.8% and 11 crime/law bills
passed into law; the 108th, with a 47.6% success rate and 10 bills passed; the 111th, with a
36.7% success rate and 11 bills passed; and the 114th with a 34.4% success rate and 11 bills
passed.
For the 108th session—the most successful session overall—radicals sponsored 75% of
all passed bills, with just two of the passed bills not sponsored by radicals. Orrin Hatch was
particularly prolific this session: Hatch sponsored 4 separate successful crime and law bills, 3 of
which focused on juveniles/children. Republicans sponsored all but two of the successful bills
this session; top radicals Joe Biden and Dianne Feinstein sponsored the two successful
Democratic bills. All of the top radicals participated in cosponsor roles in the 108th session, with
the exception of John Chafee and Olympia Snowe. Three successful bills this session focused on
juveniles/children, and another two bills focused on law enforcement/policing.
In the 111th session, radicals sponsored 72.7% of all successful bills. Dick Durbin,
Dianne Feinstein, and Patrick Leahy successfully sponsored 2 bills each. All of the top radicals
besides Lisa Murkowski and John Chafee participated in cosponsorship, though Murkowski was
among the successful sponsors. Murkowski’s bill was also the only successful
Republican-sponsored crime and law bill to pass this session. Senators seemed to focus on
drugs/gangs bills this session, with 4 separate successful bills focused on the issue. Another two
successful bills focused on law enforcement/policing.
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Radicals accounted for a slim majority of sponsors in the 114th session at 54.5% of all
sponsors. Republicans successfully sponsored 7 bills, and Democrats successfully sponsored 4
bills. John Cornyn, who does not rank among the top Republican radicals, sponsored 4 separate
successful bills. All radicals cosponsored this session, except for John Chafee and Arlen Specter.
Three separate bills focused on each drugs/gangs and law enforcement/policing, and another 2
bills focused on terrorism.
The 106th session was notably different from the other three: radicals accounted for just
30% of all sponsors, though top radical Patrick Leahy did successfully sponsor two separate
bills. Republicans sponsored all but three successful bills. All radicals except for John Chafee
and Gordon Smith participated in cosponsorship roles. A main focus of this session was around
law enforcement/policing bills, which accounted for 4 separate successful bills. Another 2 bills
focused on criminal justice reform.
The network analyses for each session can be found on pages 15-18 [Figure 3.4, Figure
3.5, Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7]. Beginning in chronological order, there are a few things to note
about the 106th network. First of all, the 106th session was the densest of all four sessions (.07),
meaning that the 106th network had the highest proportion of possible links between members
enacted. Secondly, despite the fact that Orin Hatch served as judiciary chairman, Patrick Leahy
remained more central to the network. Leahy collaborated extensively across the aisle and
partnered with 7 Republicans, and 4 Democrats. Third, perhaps not unsurprisingly given the low
percentage of instigators represented in sponsorship roles, other instigators were largely on the
outskirts of this network. Arlen Specter was particularly isolated and collaborated with just John
Ashcroft (R-MO). Chuck Grassley also only collaborated with Spencer Abraham (R-MI) and Jon
Kyl (R-AZ). Democratic instigators were also limited in their collaboration, though Democrats
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collaborated more across the aisle. Joe Biden collaborated with Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and
Patrick Leahy, as well as Republican Jon Ashcroft. Dianne Feinstein exclusively collaborated
with Republicans, including Susan Collins, Lincoln Chafee (R-RI), Spencer Abraham, and Jon
Kyl. Particularly notable in this session is the fact that just 3 successful bills had perfectly
bipartisan CPD, and all of these bills were sponsored by instigators (2 by Patrick Leahy, and 1 by
Dianne Feinstein).
The 108th network differs significantly from the 106th. The 108th session was the most
successful session, but it had the lowest density of all the four top sessions (density=.05). In this
network, Judiciary Committee Chair Orin Hatch was able to successfully draw in members from
both parties.  Hatch was most central to the network (closeness=.87) and was also in the most
significant broker position (betweenness=1,263). Instigator participation was noticeably split in
this network. Dianne Feinstein and Joe Biden played important broker roles, respectively
accounting for the 2nd and 3rd highest degree of betweenness. This reflects Feinstein and
Biden’s ability to serve as bridges to draw in otherwise distant members in the network:
Feinstein drew in 3 Republicans and 1 Democrat; Biden drew in 2 Republicans and 1 Democrat.
From there, Chuck Grassley played an important mediating role by collaborating with both
Feinstein, Biden, and Hatch. Grassley was the 6th highest broker in the network. In contrast,
Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter were more inactive in the network. Each only collaborated with
Hatch and neither served as a broker. The prolific success of the 108th session may also relate to
sponsors’ ability to draw in bipartisan cosponsors: 60% of all successful bills had perfectly
bipartisan CPD.
In the 111th session, instigators played a central role. As Chair of the Judiciary
Committee, Patrick Leahy collaborated with the highest number of members (32) and served as
66
the most frequent broker (betweenness=655). Among other connections, Leahy drew in 7
otherwise non-participating Democrats and 1 frequent Republican radical, Olympia Snowe.
Dianne Feinstein played a similar role: with 25 connections, Feinstein had the second highest
degree of betweenness (641.7). Feinstein served as a bridge for 7 Democrats and 4 Republicans.
With the exception of Arlen Specter, all instigators ranked in the top ten brokers of the network.
Amy Klobuchar was particularly active, with 15 connections and a betweenness of 176.3.
Similarly to his participation in the 108th session, Specter never served as a broker in the
network and only collaborated with 3 senators.
Despite Chuck Grassley’s role as Judiciary Committee Chair in the 114th session, Orrin
Hatch again played the most significant role in facilitating the 114th network. Hatch collaborated
with 69 different senators and played a crucial facilitating role (betweenness=1,889.2). Hatch
also had the highest closeness score at .80. In contrast, Grassley collaborated with just 6 senators
and served a far smaller broker role (betweenness=.60). Other instigators, however, played more
central roles. Such was the case for Sheldon Whitehouse and Patrick Leahy, who respectively
had the third and fourth highest number of connections, and the third and fourth highest
betweenness and closeness score.
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106th Session (1999-2000): Collaboration Network on Successful Bills
* Yellow dots indicate top instigators ** Stars indicate the Judiciary Committee chair
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108th Session (2003-2004): Collaboration Network on Successful Bills
* Yellow dots indicate top instigators ** Stars indicate the Judiciary Committee chair
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111th Session (2009-2010): Collaboration Network on Successful Bills
* Yellow dots indicate top instigators ** Stars indicate the Judiciary Committee chair
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114th Session (2015-2016): Collaboration Network on Successful Bills
* Yellow dots indicate top instigators ** Stars indicate the Judiciary Committee chair
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VIII. Discussion
Radical and instigator behavior was more common for Democrats than Republicans. This
may relate back to Chapter I’s finding that Democrats demonstrated a higher degree of
enthusiasm for crime and law legislation and accounted for a larger proportion of cosponsors
overall. Each party had a wide variety of situations in which radical behavior occurred, which
may point to different motivations for instigator behavior. John Chafee’s instigator behavior, for
example, focused most frequently on gun control measures, which are largely unpopular within
the Republican party. John Chafee, for example, focused most of his radical participation on gun
control bills, which are largely unpopular within the Republican party. Chafee therefore had to
collaborate with Democrats. Others may cross the aisle due to steadfast belief in the issue area or
moral foundation. Failing to join a bill concerning the issue may create a cognitive dissonance
uncomfortable enough that members would be willing to collaborate with the opposite party in
order to avoid dissonance. This could explain why Republican instigator behavior was mainly
centered on the binding foundations.
Some senators were not instigators but did play crucial roles in the networks. Orrin Hatch
was especially prolific in drawing in cosponsors from the opposite party and played a crucial role
in the 106th, 108th, and 114th networks. Carl Levin (D-MI) and top Republican radical Susan
Collins served as bridges to draw in a distant network player, George Voinovich, in the 111th and
108th sessions, respectively. Top radical Dick Durbin had the highest closeness score (.63), the
second highest number of collaborations (28), and the third highest betweenness score (523.4) in
the 111th session.
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There was also an interesting interaction between the role of Judiciary Committee Chair
and network centrality. One of the factors possibly contributing to Hatch’s centrality despite his
lack of instigations is Hatch’s role as chair in the 106th and 108th sessions. Similarly, as chair in
the 111th session, Leahy was the most influential player of the 111th network. However,
Grassley served as chair in the 114th session, yet was a much less significant player than Hatch
in the 114th network. This may again underscore the value of senator-level issue ownership and
may suggest that Hatch has a high degree of issue ownership granted to him by his peers. The
fact that the Judiciary Committee Chair was not always the most central actor in the network
may also represent a challenges to the institutionalist perspective.
The network analyses emphasized the importance of relationships in establishing
bipartisan action. The frequency with which Dianne Feinstein and Orin Hatch collaborated may
provide support for the idea that positive externalities result from collective action (Marwell &
Oliver (1993). There was a high degree of radical participation among sponsors and cosponsors
in successful bills from these sessions: nearly every radical played a cosponsor role in each
session, and radicals sponsored legislation at least 54% of the time for every session but the
106th. This may provide support for the flow of influence among radicals. Some radicals, like
Joe Biden and Dianne Feinstein, frequently served as important bridges to draw in members of
the opposite party, or distant Democrats in the network. Overall, radicals served as crucial





This thesis opened with a mention of the First Step Act of 2018. Given everything this
thesis has discussed, a little more nuance can be given to this discussion. Dan Sullivan (R-AK)
sponsored The First Step Act. Sullivan was able to achieve a CPD leaning slightly Democratic
(.18). This may be due to elements included in the bill which balance the interests of both liberal
and conservative moral foundations. One example of this is elements which seek to reduce harm,
like a provision prohibiting solitary confinement for juveniles, and a provision prohibiting the
use of restraints on pregnant women in federal prisons. The bill also contained a provision
prohibiting discrimination against a “program, treatment, regimen, group, company, charity,
person, or entity based on the fact that it may be or is faith-based,” which likely appeals to
conservatives’ purity/sanctity foundations. Top instigators participated on the bill, including
Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) and Christopher Coons (D-DE), who both served as original
sponsors. A number of frequent radicals also participated, including Susan Collins (R-ME) and
Lisa Murkowski (R-AK).
The First Step Act provides a good example of the complicated picture of the relationship
between issue ownership, moral foundations theory, and social contagion theory in crime and
law legislation. Sponsored by a Republican, the bill is an example of the comparative success
Republicans have in passing Republican-sponsored crime and law bills. With more Democratic
cosponsors than Republican cosponsors, the bill demonstrates the enthusiasm Democrats often
express for participation in crime and law bills, regardless of the party of the sponsor. The
subject matter of the bill focuses on criminal justice reform, a subcategory typically associated
with the authority/institutions foundation favored by Republicans. One of the reasons the bill was
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able to draw support from both parties may be due in part to a number of provisions seeking to
reduce harm and advance justice, which appeals to liberal foundations. The early participation of
Whitehouse and Coons as original cosponsors underscores instigators’ low thresholds; the
participation of other radicals like Collins, who signed on about two months after the bill’s
introduction, points to the slightly higher thresholds of radicals. A network analysis of the 115th
session might reveal repeat relationships between Whitehouse, Coons, and Collins, and how they
may influence each other in a way that facilitated the bipartisan collaboration needed to
ultimately pass the First Step Act into law.
Overall, I found some notable signs pointing towards the importance of seeking out a
bipartisan balance of cosponsors. Passed bills had less than half the CPD of average bills, and the
most successful sessions had roughly half the CPD of average sessions. Part of what may be
driving the degree of bipartisanship among cosponsors in crime and law legislation may be the
fact that issue ownership seems largely unsettled. Therefore, it is unclear how generalizeable
these results are to other issue areas. This may be especially so for those issue areas which are
already to ascribed to each party, such as national security and environmental protection. Here
there may be less crossover in cosponsorship, with higher CPD margins on either side. While
Democrats were more active participants across sponsorship and cosponsorship, Republicans had
a comparative success in passing crime and law bills. Due to patterns such as the tendency for
highly partisan Democratic bills to be killed earlier in the bill lifecycle than highly partisan
Republican bills, there may also be a perceived issue ownership granted to Republicans within
the Senate that drives senators’ voting behavior on these bills.
In terms of which subcategories each party focused on, Democrats sponsored a greater
proportion of all bills but one, but Republicans had a greater comparative advantage in passing
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all subcategories but four. The majority of both parties’ most successful subcategories related to
the authority/institutions foundation. A perceived issue ownership for Republicans may be one of
the factors driving Democrats to sponsor and successfully pass bills which appear to fall within
conservative foundations. Alternatively, framing by Democrats to raise the salience of harm/care
within bills with punitive measures—such as highlighting the damage drugs or gangs can
do—may explain Democrats’ success in passing authority/institutions bills. In addition to interest
in authority/foundation bills, more than expected Republican bills related to the harm/care
foundation. This may be an attempt to draw in Democrats to cosponsorship roles, or may be
indicative of senator-level issue ownership, which was demonstrated within both parties.
Based on the variation within a party and the potential influence of individual senators as
issue owners, I operationalized those senators most willing to take bipartisan risks (joining a
bill’s cosponsors, even when they were one of the only members of their party to do so). There
were many more Democratic radicals and instigators than Republican. This likely relates to the
degree of Democratic enthusiasm for the issue of crime and law demonstrated in earlier chapters.
Both parties seemed to follow different strategies for radical behavior. Democrats participated
widely across all subcategories and may have been more influenced by pre-existing relationships
with Republican sponsors than by bill content. Republicans largely participated in radical
behavior in two situations: when the bill related to the authority/institutions foundation and not
participating on it would likely result in cognitive dissonance; and when the issue area was
unlikely to be sponsored by Republicans, such as gun control bills. The networks also
underscored the importance of senators who served as bridges connecting otherwise distant
actors to the network. These were often radicals; Joe Biden (D-DE) and Dianne Feinstein
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(D-CA) were particularly active. Other senators who were not frequent radicals were also
influential actors, like Orin Hatch (R-OH).
There are a few limitations of this study worth noting. First, the time period is limited to
1990-2018; there may therefore be limitations to the study’s generalizability. A study focused on
the Senate in the 1960s when crime levels were high might have found entirely different patterns.
Second, while certain patterns—such as those regarding CPD and bill success—seem
compelling, I cannot be certain of the causal mechanisms behind these phenomenons. Because of
this, one natural extension of this research could be to delve deeper into causal mechanisms in
order to untangle the relationship between bipartisanship and bill success. A broader time scope
could also provide important nuance to patterns in partisan issue ownership over subcategories. I
also relied mainly on early work in moral foundations theory which used a binary scale of
liberal/conservative for the foundations of relevance to each party. As mentioned previously,
there was some evidence to suggest that variation among party members could lend well to the
four group moral foundations scale, which specifies between secular liberals, religious liberals,
libertarians, and social conservatives (Haidt et al., 2009).
II. Conclusion
Crime and law is a broad category that contains areas of salience across the political
spectrum. Legislation in this area has remained popular for lawmakers for decades. It is yet to be
seen how public pressure for criminal justice and policing reform after the summer of 2020 will
play out on the Senate floor. Will liberal desire to reduce harm and seek social justice motivate
Democrats to pass a party-line bill focused on police reform? Or will President Biden, himself
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with a demonstrated history of bipartisanship in crime and law, push for a bipartisan bill in this
area?
The findings of this thesis added to the existing literature by synthesizing theories of
issue ownership, moral foundations theory, and social contagion. Ultimately, the main factors
which influence bipartisanship are a combination of these three: perceived issue ownership given
to Republicans, the success of the authority/institutions foundation and the interest in the
harm/care foundation across both parties, and the importance of radical and instigator senators in
drawing distant senators into successful networks.
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Cosponsor Partisan Difference (CPD):
A bill-level variable which takes the proportion of each party represented among the bill’s
cosponsors.
Cosponsor Partisan Difference (CPD) =
Total Proportion Dem. Cosponsors - Total Proportion Repub. Cosponsors
CPD Score Title Breakdown
0 Absolute Bipartisanship 50% of cosponsors are Democrats, and
50% of cosponsors are Republicans
+1 Absolute Democratic Partisanship 100% of cosponsors are Democrats
-1 Absolute Republican Partisanship 100% of cosponsors are Republicans
Average Cosponsor Partisan Difference (ACPD):
A session-level variable which takes the average of CPD scores across multiple bills.
Total Cosponsor Partisan Difference (TCPD):
A session-level variable which uses the total number of cosponsors from each party in order to
calculate proportions of each party represented among cosponsors.
Sponsorship Partisan Difference (SPD):
A session-level variable which takes the proportion of bills sponsored by each party.
Sponsorship Partisan Difference (SPD) =
Proportion Dem. Sponsored Bills - Proportion Repub. Sponsored Bills
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SPD Score Title Breakdown
0 Absolute Bipartisanship 50% of bills are sponsored by Democrats, and
50% of bills are sponsored by Republicans
+1 Absolute Democratic Partisanship 100% of bills are sponsored by Democrats
-1 Absolute Republican Partisanship 100% of bills are sponsored by Republicans
Average Sponsorship Partisan Difference (ASPD):
A comparative variable which takes the average SPD score across multiple sessions.
Senate Partisan Composition Difference:
A session-level variable which takes the percentage of Senate seats held by Democrats
subtracted by the percentage of Senate seats held by Republicans. In some graphs, abbreviated as
“Dem. Share of Senate” or “Repub. Share of Senate.”
Comparative Partisan Success (CPS):
Takes the percentage of bills passed by Democrats subtracted by the percentage of bills passed
by Republicans.
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